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L. WEST,
Plaintiff a.tnd Respondent,

-vs.MILES N. ANDERSON, HAL ANDERSON, CLYDE ANDERSON,
MALCOLM N. McKINNON, doing
business as AMERICAN FUEL COMpANY and CLYDE COX,

Case No.

Defendants atnd Appellants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS
MALCOLM N. McKINNON and CLYDE COX
NATURE OF THE CAS.E
On October 20, 1952 the defendant Hal Anderson
drove a truck belonging to the defendants Miles N. Anderson an'd Clyde Anderson, co-partners, to the premises
of a mine owned by the defendant Malcolm N. McKinnon,
doing business as American Fuel Company, for a load of
coal.
The coal was being loaded at the mine by the defendant Clyde Cox, an employee of the defendant Malcolm N.
McKinnon. Hal Anderson placed the truck in a position
to be loaded with coal upon terrain which, it was agreed,
sloped downward at a grade of approximately 6 percent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Clyde Cox, who was loading the trucks by means of a
scoopmobile, had placed 3 or 4 tons of coal in the truck
when it started in motion and rolled downgrade and upon
and against Steven L. West, who was reclining against
a coal pile near where the truck was being loaded. Steven
West was an independent trucker who had come to the
mine for a load of coal. The defen'dants Miles N. Anderson, Ha:l Anderson and Clyde Anderson were represented
by Attorney Dilworth Woolley. The defendants Malcolm
N. McKinnon, doing business as American Fuel Company, and Clyde Cox were represented at the trial by Rex
J. Hanson of the firm of Stewart, Cannon and Hanson.
At the outset of the trial there was another defendant, Eastern Utah Development Company, who plaintiff
claimed was the employee of Miles N. Anderson and
Clyde Anderson. The evidence showed that under the contractual arrangement they were independent contractors.
During the course of the triai the action was dismissed
as to this defendant and it is not involved in this appeal.
It was the contention of the plaintiff that Hal Anderson was an employee of Miles Anderson and Clyde Anderson and that he negligently set the brakes of the truck
he was driving, did not remain with the truck during the
loading and that he negligently failed to place blocks
under the wheels of the truck whiie it was being loaded.
Plaintiff further contended that the defendant Hal Anderson was negligent in that he left his truck parked
with the front wheels turned in a down hill direction. As
to the defendant Clyde Cox, the plaintiff contended that
he negligently loaded the truck in such a manner as to
cause the same to move from a stationary position; that
2
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is, such negligence on his part consisted of either bumping the truck with the scoopmobile or negligently drunping large loads of coal from a height of several feet into
the bed of the truck; that he failed to ascertain that the
truck was securely braked or blocked so that it would
not roll forward while being loaded, and that he loaded
the truck when it was unattended.
It was claimed that the foregoing acts of negligence
on the part of the defendants caused the truck to roll
down hill and run on to the plaintiff, who was reclining
on the ground in the vicinity of where the truck was being
loaded.
All of the defendants denied that they were negligent
in the manner claimed and all of the defendants claimed
that the plaintiff negligently caused or contributed to his
own injuries by placing himself in a reclining position
down hill and to the left of and in front of the truck which
was being loaded and further by his inattention to the
loading of said truck and failure to exercise due care for
his own safety (R. 40-45).
The case was tried to a jury and submitted to the
jury on a special verdict (R. 129-134). By reason of the
jury's answers to the questions propounded, the court
entered a judgment against the defendants for $23,690.
It is the contention of the defendants Clyde Cox and
Malcolm N. McKinnon in this appeal that the verdict
and the judgment should be set aside as to these defendants for the reason that defendant Clyde Cox was not
guilty of any negligence which was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff himself was guilty of
contributory negligence which was a proximate cause
3
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of his own injury, and because the court in its instructions and special verdicts erroneously instructed the jury
and submitted certain issues to the jury on which there
was no evidence upon which a jury could have made a
fin'ding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The place where this accident occurred is located
in Huntington Canyon in Emery County, Utah (R. 24)
and what is generally called a "wagon mine"; one not
having any rai'lroad connection (R. 407). The area is
generally illustrated by the photographs, Exhibits P-4,
P-5, P-6, M-8 and M-9. The photos will show that it is a
rather large, flat area between two canyon walls. The
area is located near the bottom of the canyon at the entrance to the American F'uel Company property. There
was a road extending through the property. On the south
side of this road there was a pile of coal dust, referred
to as "bug dust." On the north side of this road was a
smaller area than that on which the pi'le of coal dust was
located which dropped off into a stream running alongside the canyon wall. The ground at that point sloped
from the area in which the pile of coal was found, generally down hill toward the stream and down the canyon
at a grade which was agreed to be 6 percent (R. 40). A
scoopmobile operated by Clyde R. Cox (See Exhibits
1, 2 and 3) was used to loa:d coal into the trucks. The
drivers of the trucks decided among themselves whose
turn it was to be loaded (R. 178), and drove the particular truck into the area adjacent to the coal pile when it
was his turn (R. 178). The bucket on the scoopmobile
slides up and down on the rack at the front of the vehicle
4
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(Exhibits 1, 2 and 3). vVith the bucket in a lowered position, the scoopmobile is driven into the pile of coal until
the bucket is full. The bucket is then raised high enough
that it will clear the side of the truck to be loaded, at
which point the scoopmobile approaches the truck at right
angles. rrhe bucket is dumped into the truck, whereupon
the scoopmobile is backed off again and goes back to the
pile of coal for another load.
The plaintiff Steven L. West testified that he left
Salt Lake City, Utah around 2 :00 o'clock A.M. on the day
that the accident occurred, with a load of concrete to be
unloaded in Price, Utah. Upon arriving there, he and two
other fellows unloaded the concrete, after which he proceeded to the American Fuel Company mine in Huntington Canyon (H. 347). The trucks were loaded in rotation
as they came up and the plaintiff had been waiting, according to his testimony, about a half hour for his turn
at the tune of the accident. He had stationed himself
across the road and about 30 feet from where the trucks
were being loaded, and was reclining on a pile of slack
coal, with his hat over his eyes (R. 348) he was either
dozing or in his words was "sitting there thinking of all
his problems" (R. 349). He heard the trucks pulling in
to be loaded and pulling out and was aware of what was
going on, but was not watching or paying any particular
attention (R. 349). The first intimation he had of the
impending accident was an instant before the truck ran
over him (H. 350). The witness Clyde Cox testified that
the plaintiff was in the position indicated by the X on
the right hand side of Exhibit P-5, and that the truck
5
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which was being loaded was in the position of the X
with the T by it, on the left hand side of E:xhibit P..:5 (R.
182). Referring to Exhibit P -4, which is reproduced herein for the convenience of the court, he testified that the
plaintiff was in the position of the X near where the
man in that photograph is standing and that the truck
which was being loaded was in the position of the X and
the T near the pile of coal with the front of the truck
pointing in the direction of the arrow, which would be
down the canyon. The scoopmobile was located in the
position shown by the S on Exhibit P -4. He testified that
in this position the plaintiff was 40 to 50 feet from where
the trucks were being loaded, and at the time of the accident was lying down (R. 185); that the plaintiff

6
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had his hat down over his face and looked as if he were
asleep (R. 204).
The witness Hal Anderson testified that on Oct. 20,
1952 he had driven an International truck belonging to
his brother or his dad, Miles Anderson and Clyde Anderson, respectively, up Huntington Canyon to the American
Fuel Company property (R. 247). He drove up to the tipple where he was told, "They are loading dust today," so
he drove to the dust pile further down the road. He
parked his truck on the left hand side of the road and
waited 15 or 20 minutes (R. 250). During that time he
talked to a number of other truckers and observed the
plaintiff lying in the position where he was later hurt (R.
249). When it came his turn he drove onto the road and
backed alongside the coal pile (R. 251). He parked the
truck right on the road or pretty close to the road, with
the wheels turned to the left and facing down canyon, on
an incline. He then put the brakes on and placed the vehicle in first gear, after which he got out of the truck and
walked down to talk to his brother Clyde Anderson, who
was driving another truck and was also waiting to be
loaded. Clyde Anderson's truck was parked a short distance further down the canyon from where the witness
had left his truck. He had observed Clyde Cox put the
first scoop load of coal into his truck, but was not paying
much attention and did not see him put any more coal in
the truck (R. 256). He had been talking to his brother
(R. 257) when he heard someone yell, "Your truck is
moving!" He turned and started to run after it. The
front end of the truck when he first saw it was already
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across the road (R. 257). He crossed in front (R. 285)
and to the left hand side of the truck. Just as he got to
the left door, it stopped of its own accord. At that point
Clyde Cox said, "There is a man under your truck," and
they started digging him out (R. 262).
He testified that while he was still at the scene of
the accident before the coal had been dumped out of the
truck, the emergency brake was tested by letting the truck
coast off a steep grade up canyon and pulling the emergency brake on, which caused the rear wheels to slide
(R. 263). The defendant Clyde Cox testified that after
Hal Anderson had parked his truck, he got out of it and
walked 30 to 40 feet down the canyon from where he was
loading to where Mr. Anderson's brother was (see the
black cross on Exhibit P-5, marked "XCA" (R. 191).
He had put 2 or 3 loads into the truck during which time
he had noted no movement on the part of the truck other
than settling on its springs as it took the loa:d (R. 184).
After putting in the last or third load, the witness backed
the scoopmobile in a circle approximately 10 feet behind
where the truck had been standing (R. 205) and was in
the process of shifting to go forward for another scoop
load, when he observed that the truck was moving (R.
184). At that time the truck was about 30 feet from him.
He called to the plaintiff, "Look out, 'Steve!" (R. 184)
and observed the truck roll to where the plaintiff Steve
West had been lying (R. 208). He shut off the motor of
the scoop and went over to where the truck was at that
time unaware that the accident ha:d happened. Not seeing the plaintiff around anywhere, he concluded that he
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must be under the truck. He and Clyde Anderson grabbed
shovels and dug as fast as they could to get the plaintiff
out from under the truck, after which plaintiff was taken
by ambulance to the Price City Hospital (R. 206).
Cox further testified that he did not brnnp the truck
during the process of loading it (R. 195). The coal was
dumped into the truck when the bucket was approximately a foot above the side of the truck bed. He testified that
he had been loading trucks in this same manner for about
2 years, during which time he had never observed a truck
roll free (R.. 202). He further testified that it was the
custom of the truckers to remain near the truck during
the process of loading although because of the dust they
usually left the cab; that they would get on top of the
truck after he had them partially loaded and straighten
the coal around so that they could get as much weight
on the truck as possible (R. 203).
Clyde Anderson testified that on the day of the accident, he was at the American Fuel Company mine (R.
482) waiting to be loaded (R. 487); that he was parked
down hill or down the canyon from where the scoopmobile
was operating (R. 458) talking to his brother Hal (R.
453). He had observed the truck being parked and had
observed Clyde Cox put one scoop of coal in the truck.
He was not, however, watching the truck at the time it
started to move. Hal had hollered that his truck was
moving and when he observed the truck at that time,
it was almost to where Steve was lying (R. 453).
The coal from the American F'uel Company mine
was being hauled under a con tract with the Eastern
9
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Utah Development Cmnpany of which company Mr. Max
Fawcett is the manager (R. 373-4) under an arrangement
whereby the court determined the Andersons were independent contractors.
On December 30 or 31, 1953 the truck which had been
involved in this accident was reassembled and. put in the
same condition that it was on the day of the accident (R.
467), it was then taken to the premises of the American
Fuel Company. Hal Anderson, Clyde Anderson, Rex
Hanson, a photographer, Frank Stauffer, a deputy
sheriff and Clyde Cox were present (R. 467-9). Hal
Anderson parked the truck in the exact spot where it
had been parked on the day of the accident. He put the
truck in first gear and pulled the emergency brake on
tight, as he testified he had done on the day of the accident. The truck was then examined by Max F'awcett and
by Deputy Sheriff Frank Stauffer to make certain that
the truck was in gear and the brakes were on. Clyde Cox
then took the same scoopmobile and put a load of coal in
the truck in the same manner from the same position as
on the day the accident occurred (R. 470). Mr. Cox then
reloaded the scoopmobile and was advised this time to
bump the truck as hard as he could without endangering
himself, which was done. On the third load, he raised
the scoopmobile bucket to its extreme height and completely dropped the entire amount of coal from the bucket
into the truck from that distance. The truck bounced up
and down and shook, but did not move forward. Cox then
reloaded the scoopmobile, drove it around behind the
truck and did his best to try to push the truck forward
10
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down the canyon. The wheels did not turn, but did slide
forward some 14 to 16 inches. A movie of this experiment
was taken and introduced into evidence (Exhibit M21).
The plaintiff testified as part of the evidence on
damages that during the year 1951 he made around $2,400 prospecting and hauling coal (R. 336-7), and that
during the year 1952 he made around $2,600 (R. 337);
that at the time of the accident, he was earning $300 per
month, with withholding tax taken out (R. 345). This
was the only evidence on his loss of earning capacity.
STATEMENT OF· POINTS
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANTS MALCOLM N. McKINNON AND CLYDE COX WERE NOT GUILTY OF ANY
NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE IN JURY TO THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT II. PLAINTIFF WAS HIMSELF GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS OWN INJURY.
POINT III. THE .COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS AND IN SUBMITTING ISSUES TO THE JURY
WHICH WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND OVER-ACCENTUATED PLAINTIFF'S THEORY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANTS MALCOLM N. McKINNON AND CLYDE COX WERE NOT GUILTY OF ANY
NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF.

At the close of the evidence, defendants Malcolm
N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox moved for a directed verdict
upon the grounds that no act or conduct on the part of
Clyde Cox could have been a legal proximate cause of
the accident; that the evidence conclusive'ly showed that
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if the brakes on the truck had been set or the vehicle
placed in proper gear that the loading operation would
not have caused it to roll forward, upon the further
ground that Clyde Cox was entitled to assunw until it
reasonably appeared to the contrary that the truck would
be left with its brakes fully applied and in proper gear
before he commenced to loa;d it, that there was nothing
to put him on notice to the contrary in the evidence. The
motion was taken under advisement by the court and
among other issues, the court submitted to the jury the
issues of whether Clyde Cox was negligent in:
(a)

bumping the truck with the scoopmobile;

(b) in dumping large loads of coal into the truck
from a height greater than that which a reasonably prudent person would have used under the existing circumstances;
(c) in failing to ascertain that the dump truck was
so securely braked or blocked that it would not roll down
hill while being loaded; and
(d) in proceeding to load the dump truck while it
was unattended.
The jury absolved Clyde Cox of negligence under
(a) and (b) but found that he was negligent in (c) and
(d), but on the latter issue found that his negligence
was not a proximate cause of the accident (R. 495-6).
As a result of the jury's findings, the only issue raised by
the defendants' motion for a directed verdict is: was
there sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue
of whether Clyde Cox was negligent by "failing to as-
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certain that the dump truck was so securely braked or
the wheels blocked, before starting to load it; and was
he required to foresee that if this was not done, the truck
would roll down hill and against and upon the plaintiff1
There was no evidence at the trial that C1yde Cox
exercised any supervision or control over the operation
of the truck.
In determining whether Clyde Cox was negligent under the circmnstances, it should be kept in mind that
the motion picture submitted in evidence showed conclusively that if the truck was properly braked, it would
not roll forward because of the force connected with or
resulting from the loading operation. The court will recaH that Clyde Cox testified and the motion pictures verified when the experiment was made that he was instructed to hit the side of the truck with the scoopmobile with
as much force as possible without jeopardizing the equipment or his own safety, and that after 3 scoops of coal
had been dumped into the truck, he attempted to push
the truck down hill with the scoopmobile but was unable
to do more than skid the truck's rear wheels, which showed that failure to block the wheels had nothing to do
with causing the accident, that no action on the part of
Clyde Cox caused the truck to roH down the hill, and
the jury so found in their answers to the interrogatories.
If nothing Clyde Cox did caused the truck to
roll, and he did not supervise the mechanical operation
of the truck, would he have any more duty to ascertain
if the truck was securely braked or the wheels blocked
than any other person who happened to be in the vicinity1

13
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If Stephen West could assume the truck was securely
braked, was not Clyde Cox entitled to the same assumption~

The evidence was also undisputed that Clyde Cox
was employed solely as a handyman on the premises.
One of his duties was to operate the scoopmobile. He
was not familiar with the mechanism of this truck or
the various types of trucks whose owners drove them
on to the premises to purchase coal. Inasmuch as most
of the drivers owned their own trucks, they were anxious
to get loaded and be on their way as soon as possible.
The custom was to load the trucks in the order in which
they arrived. The evidence showed that the braking
mechanism and gear ratio of modern day trucks are
complicated and, of course, the average person in observing the truck would not know whether it was partially
or securely braked. Cox was unfamiliar with the truck's
mechanism.
The truck involved in this accident was equipped
with an Eaton two-speed, rear axle, the safe operation
of which required the truck to be parked in low gear
range on a down grade, because if left in high range,
after the vacuum part of the mechanism had become
equalized, a spring would attempt to pull the gear from
high range to low range, and if the cogs on the gears
happened to be on dead center so that the gears could
not mesh, there was nothing to prevent the truck from
moving forward in free wheeling as the emergency brake
or transmission gear would then have no effect on the
movement of the truck's rear wheels. Was it unreason-
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able for Clyde Cox to assume that the drivers of the
trucks; in this case, Hal Anderson's concern for the
safety of the truck, would not result in his taking the
necessary precautions to see that the truck was in good
mechanical condition and that the brakes were properly
set~ Even if he had climbed down off his scoopmobile,
walked over to the truck and looked inside the cab, he
would not have known whether the truck was properly
parked in low gear range. Was Clyde Cox in his capacity
required to anticipate not only that Hal Anderson had
not properly braked the truck, but also that Stephen
West would be so inattentive as to be injured if the truck
rolled forward~ The evidence showed that the truck
was somewhere between 30 and 50 feet from the plaintiff. By moving to either side, he could have avoided
this accident if he had observed the truck start to roll
toward him. If West was entitled to assume that the
truck was properly braked, and he must have done so,
as he had his hat over his eyes and apparently was either
oblivious or unconcerned about the fact that the truck
was pointed in his direction while being loaded, was not
Clyde Cox entitled to the same assumption~
The defendants were not insurers of the safety of
those who might come to their premises for coal. Their
duty was only to exercise reasonable and ordinary care
under the circumstances. The general rule is stated by
our Supreme Court in the case of Quinn. v. Gas & Coke
Company, 42 Utah 113, 129 P. 362, as follows:
"What legal duty did appellant owe respondent as one of its customers~ It was the duty to
exercise ordinary care and diligence to provide
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and maintain a reasonably safe place for ingres8
and egress to and from its place of business for
its customers, and to exercise the same degree
of care and diligence to prevent injury to them
and to their property while they were lawfully in
its place of business or on its premises. Appellant,
however, was not an insurer of the safety of its
customer; nor was it required to avoid all accidents, either to them or their property, at its
peril. The respondent, therefore, was required
to show that appellant in some way had omitted
to exercise that degree of care and diligence for
her safety stated above, and that by reason of
such want of care her dress was injured as alleged .... "
The duty of the owner of the premises toward an
invitee a.rises from his superior knowledge of the premises and where, as in this case, the danger inherent in
a situation, if any, is as obvious to the invitee as it is
to the owner of the premises, the owner has no duty to
warn the invitee. In the case of AustVn. v. Riverside
Portland Cement Co., (Cal.) 271 P2 943, an action was
brought for injuries sustained by contractor's employees
who received electrical shocks when contractor's crane
came into contact with overhead power line on defendant
cement company's premises. The court held that the
evidence on issues of whether defendant had had superior
knowledge of the dangerous condition or had failed to
exercise ordinary care in providing a safe place to work
did not support a finding that the defendant had
breached its duty to plaintiffs. The court said:
''The general rules as to the duty owed by an
owner of land to an invitee thereon are well set-
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tled. l-Ie owes a duty to have his premises in a
reasonably safe condition, and to give warning
of latent or concealed perils which are known to
him and not to the other. The owner is not an
insurer as to such an invitee and the true ground
of his liability, if any, is his superior knowledge
of the perilous condition and the resulting danger
to the invitee. The owner is required to use
ordinary care for the safety of the invitee and to
give warning of a danger attendant upon the work
which the person invited is to do thereon if such
danger arises from causes or conditions which are
not readily apparent to the eye. Usually, he is
not required to give the invitee notice of warning
of an obvious danger."
The evidence shows that in the two years Clyde
Cox had been loading coal, at the mine of the American
Fuel Company, that this was the first time that a truck
had ever moved from its moorings and rolled down hill.
Under such circumstances, the defendant had no duty
to anticipate such would be the case in this instance. As
stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Negligence, sub-section (e), page 817:
"As stated in Section 290, comments (f) to
(h), the actor is required to recognize the fact
that a certain number of animals and human
beings may act in a way which is not customary
in the great mass thereof, and that there are
occasional exhibitions of the operation of natural
forces which are radically different from the
normal. It would, however, be impractical to set
a standard of behavior so high as to require every
man under all circumstances to take into account
the chances of these exceptional actions and operations. rrherefore, except where the actor has
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reason to expect the contrary, he is entitled to
assume that human beings and animals will act
and that natural forces will operate in their usual
manner, unless their exception or action or operation would create a serious chance of grave harm
to some valuable interest and there is little utility
in the actor's conduct. Thus, a motorist approaching an intersection of two highways, is entitled
to assume that the other motorists on the intersection highways will observe the rules of the
road, since motor traffic would be unreasonably
delayed unless motorists were permitted to act
on such assumptions. On the other hand, a motorist approaching a railroad crossing is not entitled
to assume that the railroad company will comply
with its duties to blow the whistles and ring the
bell, but is required to take very great precautions
to look out for trains, which have not given such
notice of their approach."
In Martin v. Stevens (Utah) 243 P2 747, where it
was argued that a driver was negligent in entering an
intersection upon the assumption the other driver would
yield the right of way, it was said at page 751 of the
Pacific Reporter:
" .... He was not obligated to anticipate either
that other drivers would drive negligently, or
would fail to accord him his right of way, until
in the exercise of due care, he observed, or should
have observed, something to warn him that the
other driver was driving negligently, or would
fail to accord him his right of way. If this principle is not clear in the earlier cases, it is firmly
established by the more recent expressions of
this court."
The rule announced in Hilliard v. Utah By-Products
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Cornpany, 1 Utah (.:2) 287, 263 P(2) 287, is particularly
applicable to the evidence in this case, not only as to
whether Clyde Cox should have foreseen the negligent
conduct on the part of Hal Anderson in parking the
truck, but also as to his duty to foresee that the plaintiff
would not exercise reasonable care for his own safety:
"In applying the test of foreseeability to
situations where a negligently created pre-existing
condition combines with a later act of negligence
causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clearcut distinction between two classes of cases. The
first is where one has negligently created a
dangerous condition (such as parking a truck)
and a later actor observed, or circumstances are
such that he could not fail to observe, but negligently failed to avoid it. The second situation
involves conduct of a later intervening actor who
failed to observe the dangerous condition until it
was too late to avoid it. In regard to the firs•
situation, it is held as a matter of law that the
latter intervening act does interrupt the natural
sequence of events and cuts off the legal effect
of the negligence of the initial actor. This is bas~ed
upon the reasoning that it is not reasonably to
be foreseen nor expect,ed that one who actually
becomes cognizant of a dangerous condition in
ample time to avoid injury will fail to do so. On
the other hand, with respect to the second situation, where the second actor fails to see the danger
in time to avoid it, it is held that a jury question
exists based on the rational that it can be reasonably anticipated that circumstances may arise
wherein others may not observe the dangerous
condition until too late to avoid it. The distinction
is basically one between a situation in which the
second actor has sufficient time, after being
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charged with knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it
and one in which the second actor negligently becomes confronted with an emergency situation."
So say we here, until reasonably put on notice to
the contrary, Cox was entitled to assume that Hal Anderson would use reasonable care in parking a truck which
was in a reasonably safe mechanical condition.
In the case of Mehl v. Carter, 237 P2 240 (Kan.),
an action was brought to recover damages to realty
caused by a fire which started in a building owned by the
defendant. The evidence showed that the defendant kept
gasoline on the premises in violation of certain city ordinances. The evidence further showed that the receptacle containing the gasoline was knocked over by persons having no connection with the defendant, the gas
becoming ignited and causing the fire and resulting
damage. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant
and the appellants contended that the defendant was
liable as a matter of law. Upon the question of whether
he should have foreseen the fire, the court said:
''Of course, a person cannot without liability
create a condition which, in the exercise of reasonable care, should cause him to realize that
injury is probable or likely to occur but a person
is not liable for a consequence which is merely
possible but not likely to occur. Stated in another
way, one is bound to anticipate and provide
against that which usually happens or is likely
to happen but it would impose too heavy a burden
to be held responsible for guarding against what
is unusual or unlikely to happen and what has
been said to be only remotely or slightly probable.
(Citations given) ..... Had appellee's employees
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knocked the can off the bench in the course of
his duties a different question would be presented
with respect to what appellee reasonably should
have anticipated. But that is not this law suit.
We think we would not be justified in concluding
as a matter of law that appellee, in the exercise
of reasonable care should have anticipated the
danger of some outsider going behind a work
bench and there disturbing tools or equipment
located at the rear of such a bench. Surely appellee was not obligated, as a matter of law, to
anticipate a scuffle by outsiders would be probable or was likely to occur at such a place .... "
"In the Rowell case, supra, 162 Kan. 294,
176 P2 592, it was held: 'Natural and probable
consequences are those which human foresight
can anticipate because they happen so frequently
they may be expected to recur.'"
In this case, any act of the defendants Malcolm N.
McKinnon and Clyde Cox was twice removed from the
injury to the plaintiff. Not only do we have the intervening negligence of the defendant Hal Anderson, but
we also have the conduct of the plaintiff in stationing
himself in a position of peril in front of the defendant
Hal Anderson's truck, oblivious to what was going on
around him. Considering the experience of the defendant- that during the 2 years that Clyde Cox had been
loading trucks in the past, no truck had ever rolled forward while being loaded and that it was not the practice
to block the wheels - the finding of the jury that the
defendant Clyde Cox was negligent goes beyond the
limits of what might reasonably be foreseen by him and
makes the defendants Insurers of the safety of every
21
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person who might choose to enter upon the prmnises of
the defendants.
POINT II. PLAINTIFF WAS HIMSELF GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS OWN INJURY.

The evidence was that the plaintiff placed himself
in a position down hill and slightly off to the other side
of the road from the point where the trucks were being
loaded and then proceeded to ignore the activities which
were going on, although he was aware that trucks were
being loaded and moving in and out of the area all the
time. Had he either selected a safer spot in which to
recline or been attentive to the activity which was going
on around him, he could have avoided this accident almost
up to the very second in which it happened. The truck
was moving slowly. Hal Anderson testified he had time
to run in front of it before the forward momentum stopped (R 285).
Plaintiff claims that the defendants should have
been aware of the dangers inherent in this situation and
taken precautions to protect the plaintiff, while contending that plaintiff, who was himself aware of the same
situation, should be absolved for ignoring the perils inherent in the situation.
The rule announced in Hooten .et al v. City of Burley (Ida.), 219 P2 651, is particularly applicable to this
case. In that case, the defendant, a municipal corporation, disconnected 2 lead wires from a pole on the west
side of a street, and coiled them up and hung them in a
small tree so that a Mr. Aldrich and the person for whose
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death this action was brought could remove some trees
from the premises of a man named Carson. At the time
the wires were disconnected, the current in the wires was
turned off, but it was turned on by an automatic time
switch about 5 :15 p.m. of the same day. The deceased,
noticing that the wires were flashing and emitting
sparks, was seen near the wires and then later found on
the ground with one of the coils of wire around his body.
No one actually saw him touch the wires. The court
relying on the presumption that the deceased exercised
due care for his own safety held that under the evidence
whether or not he was contributorily negligent was a
question for the jury. In so doing, however, they announced the following rules of law, which we believe are
applicable to this case:
"It is a general rule of law that if one knows
of the danger brought about by the negligence of
another, and understands and appreciates the risk
therefrom, and voluntarily exposes himself to
such danger, he is precluded from recovering for
resulting injuries.
"Further where one claiming damages for
personal injuries contributes to the injury by want
of ordinary care by placing himself in the dangerous position where he might be injured, and
does not exercise ordinary care in preventing injury to himself after being placed in such a position, then the mere fact than another was negligent would not relieve the one injured from the
effects of his contributory negligence, and if the
person injured could have avoided such circumstances by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, then no recovery can he had ... "
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In Restatement of the Law, Torts, Section 340, Page
927, it is said:
"A possessor of land is not subject to liability to his licensees, whether business visitors
or gratuitious licensees, for bodily harm caused
to them by any dangerous condition thereon,
whether natural or artificial, if they know of the
condition and realize the risk involved therein."
In Murriay v. R~alph D'Oench Co. (Mo.), 147 SW2
623, 13 Negligence Cases 638, the plaintiff, a woman 72
years of age, went to a beauty parlor and when she arrived she was informed by the attendants that they were
cleaning up a spot on the floor. The janitor employed by
defendant testified that he cleaned the beauty parlor
every morning before any customers arrived and that
as he was finishing up he was asked to try to remove
a stain on the floor. One of the attendants sprinkled
some cleaning powder on the floor and rubbed it with
his mop. He mopped the spot with the wet mop and intended to do so with the dry mop but was prevented from
doing so because customers were due. Plaintiff testified
that she saw the damp spot when it was pointed out upon her entrance. The defendant appealed from a judgment for the plaintiff and the court used this language:
"We have held that the true ground of liability (of an owner or occupant of lands to an
invitee) is the proprietor's superior knowledge
of an unsafe condition and its dangers. We have,
therefore, ruled, where the condition is so open
and obvious that it is as apparent to the invitee
as to the owner or where the condition is actually
known to the invitee, that there is no liability;

24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

otherwise, the proprietor would be in effect an
insurer."
In Kitchen v. Women's City Club (Mass.) 166 NE
554, the facts were that the defendant, a Club organized
to establish acquaintance among women and to provide
a club house where members might meet informally, maintained such a house in Boston; the plaintiff and three
other women were recei-v-ed as guests at the club house.
The floor of the club house was of hard wootl and was
highly polished. While in her room she heard a knock at
the door and started for the door and slipped on the
middle of the rug, which was pushed against the mantle,
and the plaintiff was thrown to the floor whereby she
sustained injuries. A motion for directed verdict was
granted. Says the court:
"That the defendant owed a duty to its paying guests to use reasonable care that the premises as a whole, and the rooms assigned to the use
of the guests in particular, should be reasonably
fit and safe for such use is obvious. And it is
plain that it is its duty to take fair and reasonable
precautions that the guest is informed and warned
against all damages incident to the enjoyment of
club privileges, which are not obvious to the senses
of an ordinarily intelligent person. As a corollary,
it follows that no duty is owed to a guest, where
the conditions are op.en wnd obvious to an ordinarily intelligent person, to make changes in such
conditions or call attention to da,ngers which are
apparent to the senses of such a person. If the
law is applied to the facts of this case, the verdicts
were directed rightly. The plaintiff knew all the
conditions of which she complains, she knew that
light rugs when stepped on may be expected to
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slip on slippery floors, but she did not anticipate
that the rug in the roorn in question would slip
on the floor of that room. She appreciated and
voluntarily assumed the risk of any accident which
naturally attached to the condition she observed,
and by assenting negatived the existence of any
duty on the part of the defendant to warn her of
such dangers ... We are of the opinion the plaintiffs have no right of action for the causes alleged
in their pleadings or for any cause which the testimony would support."
A business invitee has a duty to exercise reasonable
care for his own protection. In the case of Knox v. Snow,
(Utah) 229 P2 874, the plaintiff went upon the premises
of defendant, a service station operator, for the purpose of purchasing. a tire for his car. The defendant
informed him that he did not have a tire but might have
an interliner suitable for the plaintiff's purposes. The
plaintiff observed through the door of the sales room
out in the repair shop at the far end of the shop there
was an interliner which he thought would be suitable.
At that point, without any directions from Allen, he
proceeded toward the tire racks and was injured when
he fell into a grease rack. The court said:
". . . For the purpose of this case, we shall
assume plaintiff was an invited business visitor
when he entered and while he was in the work
room. In spite of this assumption, we have great
doubts as to whether the evidence establishes
negligence on the part of the defendants. However, we pass that question and affirm the judgment because plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law."
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rrhe general rule regarding contributory negligence
is stated on page 861 of 38 Am. Jur., as follows:
"It is said that when the defense of contributory negligence is urged as ground for a nonsuit,
it must appear that reasonable men, acting as the
triers of the fact, would find, without any reasonable probability of differing in their views, either
that the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger, or that ordinarily prudent men under the
same circumstances would readily acquire such
knowledge and appreciation. As it generally is
expressed, a plaintiff will not be held to have been
guilty of contributory negligence if it appears
that he had no knowledge or means of knowledge
of the danger. . . "
In this instance, the plaintiff had, or under the circumstances should have had, the same knowledge of the
situation or any danger to himself arising from the position of the truck as did the defendant Clyde Cox. The
probability of the truck rolling forward if not properly
braked was obvious to anyone in the vicinity. He had
within his power the means of preventing his own injury
by the simple precaution of moving to a spot of greater
safety. Had he looked, by moving a few feet to either
side, he could have avoided the truck after it started to
move. By voluntarily placing himself in a position of
danger and continuing to remain therein, he assumed
any risk inherent to the situation and sho'Uld be precluded from recovery by reason of his own contributory
negligence.
In Wold v. Ogden City et al (Utah) 258 P2 453, the
plaintiff brought action against the city and a construe-

27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion company for mjuries sustained when plaintiff fell
into a ditch which had been dug in the street in front of
his house. The trial court dismissed the action and this
Honorable Court upheld the dismissal on the grounds
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
and had assumed a known risk, and was, therefore, precluded as a matter of law from recovering against the
city or contractor for his injury.
The facts were that the plaintiff, in the afternoon,
had observed a trench 4 feet deep and 2¥2 feet wide dug
in the street in front of his home. Upon coming home
with his wife late at night and in order to avoid walking
one-half block to either end of the trench, he straddled
the trench at a very dark place in order to help his wife
across, but fell in the trench when the wall gave way.
The court said :
"Without discussing the matter of which
grounds the trial court relied on in making its decision, we believe that he specifically based his
decision either on contributory negligence, claimed
as error by the appellant, or the doctrine of assumption of risk, no error was committed and
therefore appellant was not deprived of any constitutional right to a jury trial. ..
"Plaintiff admitted the hazardous condition
in his complaint. Also in his brief when he said,
'We have presented by the facts of this appeal a
situation of appellant exposing himself to a known
danger in order to exercise the right and privilege
which he has to use the highways and streets.' But
such right and privilege are not without limitation and certainly cannot include the prerogative
of use without the exercise of due care. It would
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semn that a reasonable, prudent person would
not expose himself to a known danger when there
is an easy, known and convenient route around
it. Plaintiff's conduct, aside from the concept
of assumption of risk, was unreasonable in the
light of this known hazard and the existence of
a convenient, hardly burdensome detour at the
intersection of Grant and Eighteenth Street,
where the trench ended and through which plaintiff had driven shortly before his injury. To deliberately attempt to cross under such circumstances seems to be that type of lack of due care
not attributable to the ordinarily prudent person
exercising care for his own safety.
"Plaintiff also was precluded, having assumed the risk of injury under the circumstances
of this case. vV e emphasize the fact that he knew
of the hazard of 4 :00 p.m. and at 2 :30 a.m. when he
'looked the situation over.' The doctrine of assumption of risk, ordinarily applicable to an employer-employee relation, has been extended to
some situations where one knows of a condition
and concludes to accept its attendant hazards and
acts accordingly without force or of necessity.
"Dean Prosser points up this principle as it
applies to the instant case when he asserts that
an objective standard must maintain, and that 'the
plaintiff cannot be heard to say that he did not
comprehend a risk which must have been obvious
to him.' Further that 'as in the case of negligence
there are certain risks which anyone of adult age
must be taken to appreciate: the danger of slipping on ice, or falling through unguarded openings,' etc. He goes on to say that 'In the usual
case, his knowledge and appreciation of danger
will be a question for the jury; but where it is
clear that any person of normal intelligence in

29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

his position must have understood the danger,
the issue must be decided by the court.'
"We think the facts of this case bring it within the principles announced, and it is no answer
to say that plaintiff may not have known the bank
of the trench would give way, since no adult person of ordinary intelligence, knowing of the
trench, would take such chances on what counsel
characterizes as being an 'extremely dark area,
no lights, and in the middle of the night and in
the shade of the trees,' where there was an easy
and safe access to his home in a matter of minutes."
Nor can we absolve the plaintiff merely by reason
of the fact that he failed to observe the dangers of his
situation. In the case of Scofield v. Sprouse-Reitz Company (Utah) 265 P2 396, a salesman, calling upon the
defendant's store manager, on office platform, mounted
stairs wliich were adequately lighted but which were
without a hand rail. In turning to go down the stairs,
the salesman lost his balance and pitched over the side
of the stairway. This court held that the salesman was
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. After discussing
the Knox v. Snow case, supra, the court said:
"The present case presents an even more obvious situation for contributory negligence than
in the Knox case, for it does not require that we
attribute to plaintiff knowledge of the particular
type of place. He had ample opportunity to observe and, as a reasonably prudent man, should
have looked to locate the hand rail before he attempted to put his weight on it. The light was
sufficient, he knew that he was on a platform, and
although he may have been preoccupied with try30
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ing to make a sale, he 1nust be held to take the
sin1ple precaution of a quick glance to assure .J.imself of safety as would a reasonably prudent man.
Likewise the store manager would have no reason
to suspect that plaintiff had not observed the lack
of a hand rail on his way up the stairs and would
not feel it necessary to warn him as he started
down the stairs of a condition which was obvious
to all."
The verdict of the jury in this case places us on the
horns of a dilemna by reason of its very inconsistency.
They found that the defendant Hal Anderson was negligent in failing to set the brakes of the truck and in turning the front wheels of the truck in a down hill direction
when parking the same, and that the defendant Clyde Cox
was guilty of negligence in failing to ascertain that the
truck was securely braked or blocked. None of these
acts were negligent unless the probability of injury could
be foreseen or should have been foreseen by the defendants. VVe must, therefore, introduce a third element into
the picture, and that is the presence of the plaintiff in a
position where he might be injured if the truck should
roll down hill and turn to the left in rolling. What the
jury has in effect said by its verdict is that the defendant
Hal Anderson was negligent in failing to set the brakes
of the truck and turning the front wheels of the truck
in a down hill direction by reason of the fact that he
should have foreseen that the truck might roll down hill
and roll onto the plaintiff, and that the defendant Clyde
Cox was negligent in failing to ascertain if the truck was
securely braked or blocked, because he should have anti-
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cipated that Hal Anderson would negligently fail to set
the truck brakes, permitting it to roll onto the plaintiff,
but that the plaintiff, to whom the situation was equally
apparent was not negligent in placing himself in a position where he might be injured if such occurred and that
he had no duty to ascertain or anticipate that if the
brakes of the truck were not set or the front wheels of the
truck turned in a down hill direction that the truck might
roll onto him. Therefore, they are saying what should
have been apparent to the defendants as reasonable and
prudent men should not have been apparent to the plaintiff under the same circumstances as a reasonable and
prudent man. This, of course, 1nakes the standard of care
dependent not as it should be on the question of whether
or not the actor, be he plaintiff or defendant, acted as
reasonable and prudent men under the circumstances
would act, but rather whether he is plaintiff or defendant.
We contend that as a matter of law, under the evidence,
neither the defendant Cox nor the plaintiff West were
negligent in failing to anticipate Hal Anderson's negligence. In this instance both were entitled to assume that
the defendant Hal Anderson had exercised reasonable
care to set the truck brakes and place it in low range
gear so that it would remain in position during the loading operation; however, if Cox was negligent in failing
to anticipate that Hal Anderson would be negligent, and
West would be injured thereby, was not West under an
equal if not a greater duty to likewise anticipate Anderson's negligence and the probability of injury to himself.
After all, his personal safety was involved. We submit
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that if under these circumstances Cox was negligent, then
West must also have been contributorily negligent as a
matter of law.
POINT III. THE .COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS, SUBMITTING ISSUES TO THE JURY WHICH
WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND OVERACCENTUATED PLAINTIFF'S THEORY.

In the second point of this brief, we have already
discussed the court's error in submitting the issues of
negligence on the part of the defendants Malcolm N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox, which was not warranted under
the evidence in the case or the law applicable thereto.
Specifically, the issue that these defendants were negligent in failing to ascertain that the truck was securely
braked or blocked so that it would not run down hill while
being loaded. We will not, therefore, discuss the matter
further here.
The court's instructions placed undue emphasis on
the plaintiff's theory of the case and did not give eqnal
emphasis to the theory of the defendants. Let us first
review the instruction dealing with the duties of the
various parties :
In instruction number 10, the court instructed the

JUry:
"You are instructed that Hal Anderson owed
Steven L. West a duty to use reasonable care n•Jt
to injure him, and he had a further duty to conduct himself in regard to the manner in which he
parked and attended his truck as a reasonably
prudent man would do under the same or similar
circumstances. In determining whether or not Hal
Anderson used ordinary care and conducted him-
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self as a reasonably prudent man, you should take
into consideration the lay of the land, the manner
in which the wheels of the truck were turned when
it was abandoned, the amount of care and consideration which was given to the truck after it was
parked and while it was being loaded, and all of
the surrounding circumstances existing at the time
of the happening of the event in question."
The court will note that the instruction goes into
great detail as to the matters which might be taken into
consideration and should have been sufficient for all
purposes; however, the court reiterated the same point
thereby giving them overemphasis in instruction number
11, which was to the effect:
"You are further instructed that in parking
his truck on a down hill grade at the loading
place, Hal Anderson had a duty to set the hand
brake securely before leaving his truck unattended; and if he failed to do this, he would be guilty
of negligence.
"You are further instructed that it was his
duty to turn the front wheels of the truck in such
a manner that it would not run down hill if the
brakes should become loosened; and if a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary
care would have foreseen that the brakes might
loosen and the truck leave its stationary position,
then the said Hal Anderson would be negligent
in leaving the wheels pointing in a down hill
direction."
Although these two instructions were concerned with
the issue of Hal Anderson's negligence, inasmuch as the
court in his instructions submitted the issue of whether
Cox had a duty to anticipate such negligence, the instruc34
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tions over-emphasized the duty of Cox and accentuated
the plaintiff's theory of recovery.
In instruction number 12, the court undertook to
instruct the jury on the negligence of Clyde Cox and it
will be noted that the court did so in very positive language, setting out specifically the duty of Clyde Cox and
again went into great detail in the manner in which he
may have been guilty of a breach of that duty.
Instruction number 12 was as follows:
"You are further instructed that Steven L.
West was a business invitee upon the American
Fuel Company property, and Clyde Cox as an
employee owed Steven L. "\Vest a duty to use reasonable care to avoid harming him. That is to say,
Clyde Cox was under an obligation to conduct himself in reference to his business invitees as a reasonably prudent man would do under the same or
similar circumstances.
"In determining whether or not Clyde Cox
failed to use ordinary care in the loading of the
truck, you rnay take in to consideration the type
of equipment he was using, the fact that the truck
in which he was loading coal was unattended and
was being loaded while the front end of the truck
faced downhill at a grade of approximately six
per cent, the fact that there were no blocks placed
under the wheels of the truck while it was being
loaded and the fact that Clyde Cox had not checked to see if the truck was in gear or if the brakes
were set thereon before he started to load the
same.
"If in this regard you find by a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Clyde Cox
failed to act as a reasonably prudent man would
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have acted under the same or si1nilar circumstances, then I instruct you that he would be
negligent. If on the other hand you find that
he did act as a reasonably prudent man would
have acted under the same or similar circumstances in the manner in which he loaded the
truck, then I instruct you that he would not be
negligent."
The only instruction wherein the court dealt with
the negligence of the plaintiff was instruction number
13. You will note that the said instruction starts out with
the assertion that Steven L. West was in a position below the place where the truck was being loaded and on the
other side of the roadway, which seemed to be an indication on the part of the court that the court felt he was
in a safe place, and then goes on to tell them that if they
should find that he was in a place where motor vehicles
did not ordinarily travel, he would not he negligent.
The court in its conclusion, realizing the error of which it
had been guilty, did attempt to qualify the instruction by
the admonition that if a prudent man could have foreseen
that the truck might be set in motion and might run in
and upon the general area in which he was reclining,
then he would be negligent in assuming the position he
did without keeping an adequate lookout for his own
safety:
''You are instructed that the evidence is undisputed that immediately before Steven L. West
was injured he was sitting or reclining with his
hat over his eyes in a position below the place
where the truck was being loaded and on the other
side of the roadway. You are further instructed
that if you find from the evidence that Steven
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L. vVest was in a place which was ordinarily safe
and upon which motor vehicles did not ordinarily
run, he would not be negligent in taking that position unless a reasonably prudent person at that
time could have foreseen that a truck being loaded
might be set in motion and would likely run into
the area where he placed himself. However, if an
ordinarily prudent man could have foreseen that
a truck being loaded might be set in motion while
being loaded and that it would likely run in and
upon the general area where Steven L. West was
reclining, then Steven L. West would be negligent
in assuming the position he did without keeping an
outlook for his own safety."
Instruction number 13 loses sight of the general
duty of a reasonably prudent person to exercise reasonable care for his own safety under all the circumstances.
It does not tell the jury that a man would be negligent in
placing himself in a position in which a reasonably prudent person would realize that he may be injured but
merely tells them that if he did place himself in such a
position that he must keep a lookout for his own safety.
In the recent case of Devme v. Cook, decided by the
Utah Supreme Court on February 7, 1955 ______ Utah ______ ,
279 P2 1073, this court held that it was error for the
trial court to overaccentuate the duties of one party and
minimize the duties of the other. It pointed out that this
might be done in a number of ways, such as giving the
instructions pertaining to one party in a positive manner
and those pertaining to another in a negative manner
and not giving a number of instructions on the duty of
one party and only a few instructions on the duty of another. The court said :
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"We conclude that the Court, by the qualifying terms used, cast doubt as to the existence of
any injuries suffered by the plaintiffs and characterized the conduct of the plaintiffs as negligence.
In holding that the Court erred in giving the
instructions in this case, we cite with approval the
law enunciated in the case of Keeshin Motor Express Co., Inc. et al v. Glassman, 219 Ind. 538, 38
NE 2d 842, 850, in which the Court held as follows:
'With this situation it was incumbent upon the trial court in his instructions to clarify
the issues without giving any of them undue
prominence. This was not done. The instructions as a whole are lengthy, intricate, repetitious, argumentative, and confusing. They
tend, to appellant's disadvantage, by needless
repetition to draw the jury's consideration
away from the conduct of appellee's brother
and to lead the jury to believe that, in the
court's opinion, what he did or failed to do
was of little consequence.'
"In the case of Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, 349, in which
the court stated: 'the reiteration of given propositions to the jury in the instructions does not
have judicial approval', and after reviewing the
detailed instructions the Court stated:
'And the resulting emphasis on applicable laws unfavorable to plaintiff's side as
the result of continual reference and repeating of certain law propositions resulted in
the unbalancing of the charge, and error.'
"Even assuming that the instructions of the
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Court taken in their entirety could be considered
correct as given, the continual repetition of instructions on contributory negligence and the positive delineation of the duties of the plaintiffs, as
contrasted with the qualified negative statements
of the duties of the defendants, unbalanced the
instructions in favor of the defendants and influenced the jury in bringing its verdict of no
cause of action as against all three plaintiffs, and
therefore constituted reversible error."
The trial court in this case has been guilty of the
same error as that in D.evine v. Cook, (supra). The duties
of the defendants in this case were outlined in a very
detailed and positive manner. Every possible element
of negligence conceivable under the evidence in the case
was covered, yet in the instructions pertaining to the
conduct of the plaintiff, this was covered in a general
way and stated in a negative manner; that is, the court
instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not negligent
unless they found certain things, rather than instructing
them in a positive manner as to his duties to use reasonable care for his safety.
In the special verdict under Sections VI and VII,
the court submitted the issue of whether or not the plaintiff had sustained any yearly loss of earning capacity as
a result of this accident, and the number of years during
which such loss would continue.
The only evidence in the record on this point discloses that the plaintiff earned $2,600 per annum for
the year 1952, as disclosed by his income tax return, and
$2,400 during the year 1951. Since his recovery, he testi-
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fied that he had been earning approximately $300 per
month. There was no evidence in the record whatsoever
that he was qualified for or could earn in excess of $300
per month were it not for the injuries he sustained in
this accident. This being the case, there was absolutely
no evidence in the record upon which a verdict for any
loss of earning capacity could be based, and it was error
to submit this issue to the jury.
Physical injury and impairment of earning capacity
are not synonymous and the one does not necessarily follow from the other. As was said by the court in Schlatter
v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 19'6 P2 968:
"The evidence established with reasonable
certainty that plaintiff would sustain a permanent
disability to his right leg of at least ten per cent.
However, a distinction must be made between a
permanent injury and a permanent impairment o.f
earning capacity. The extent of the disability
to a limb or other part of the human machine is
not generally the measure of the extent of the impairment of earning capacity. A few examples will
illustrate: A 50% permanent disability of the left
hand of a practicing lawyer would probably not
impair his earning capacity to the extent of 50%.
He would still be able to interview clients, to read
cases, to walk to and from the court room, and to
perform all the other duties ordinarily incident
to the practice of his profession. On the other
hand, a 50% permanent disability of the left hand
of a concert pianist would probably amount to
total impairment of his earning capacity. S.o also,
permanent disfiguring injuries, even of a slight
nature, might result in almost total impairment of
earning capacity of a professional actress or,
model, whereas serious disfigurement, unless ac-
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companied by loss of bodily function, would hardly impair at all the earning capacity of a day
laborer."

It may be true that the plaintiff might not have been
able to perform the same work at which he was employed
before the accident; however, the accident in this respect
proved a financial benefit rather than a loss, by forcing
him into an occupation which brought him greater com-.
pensation than he had been earning prior thereto. We
submit that the evidence on this point is wholly insufficient to sustain the verdict.
The court's instruction number 9 (a) correctly defined the theory of law which was applicable under the
evidence in this case to the defendants Malcolm N. McKinnon an~ Clyde Cox. Instruction number 9'(a) provided:
"You are further instructed that any person
has a right to rely upon the assumption that other
people will not be negligent unless and until some
act is done by another person to indicate to the
contrary."
Under this instruction, Cox was entitled to assume
that the defendant Anderson had securely braked his
truck when it was parked for loading. The evidence
shows that in all of Cox's experience, no truck had rolled
away when parked for loading and there was nothing
whatever to indicate to him that Anderson had not securely braked his truck. He assumed, and as stated and
implied in the above instructions, had a right to assume,
that Anderson had not been negligent, but on the contrary, that he had made the truck secure in order that
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Cox might proceed with the loading. Now, notwithstanding the evidence and the above quoted instruction, the
court unfortunately and erroneously gave that portion
of instruction number 12, which. reads:
''In determining whether or not Clyde Cox
failed to use ordinary care in the loading of the
truck, you may take into consideration the type
of equipment he was using, the fact that the truck
into which he was loading coal was unattended
and was being loaded while the front end of the
truck faced down hill at a grade of approximately
six per cent, the fact that there were no blocks
placed under the wheels of the truck while it was
being loaded, and the fact that Clyde Cox had
not checked to see if the truck was in gear or if
the brakes were set thereon before he started to
load the same."
As has been shown under the authorities cited in
Point II of this brief, the defendants Clyde Cox and
Malcolm N. McKinnon had no such duty, for the reason
that they were not required to anticipate the negligence
of others and for the further reason that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the defendant Anderson would
fail to set the brakes of his truck or place the same in
gear, and that by reason of his failure so to do, the truck
would roll down hill and over and upon the plaintiff, and
that the plaintiff would negligently place himself in a
position in which he might be run over if the truck did
roll forward and would thereafter negligently fail to
further observe the truck or give any attention to the
loading activities.
Instruction number 12 is

enti~ely

inconsistent with
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instruction nurnber 9 (a), for if Cox was entitled to assume that Anderson had properly performed his duty
of securely braking the truck (and there can be no question that such was his duty), then Cox cannot be held
liable for proceeding to load the truck under such an assumption without inspecting it. In other words, by instruction number 12, the jury was instructed that Cox
was liable if he failed to ascertain the condition of the
truck, when by the other instruction, the jury was told
in effect that he was entitled to assume that it was securely braked for loading.
"The giving of contradictory instructions is
error."

Konold v. Rio Grande Western Ry., 21 Utah 379, 60 P.
1021; Jensen v. Utah Ry., 72 Utah 376, 270-P 349. In the
Jensen case the court remarks :
"The appellant urges that the charge given at
the request of the defendant is in conflict with
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the charge given at request
of the plaintiff, and in such particular invoked the
rule stated in Konold v. Rio Grande Western Ry.,
21 Utah 379, 60 P. 1021, 81 Am. St. Rep. 693, that
the giving of inconsistent instructions is error and
sufficient ground for reversal of the judgment, because, after verdict, it cannot be told which instruction was followed by the jury, or what influence the erroneous instruction had on their deliberations, and, as stated in Randall Instructions
to Juries, 537, that where instructions of the successful party state an erroneous rule, and those
of the defeated party state the rule correctly,
the only presumption permissible is that the
jury disregarded the true rule for the false, that
an error of instruction presenting a wrong theory
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of the case is not cured by other instructions an,
nouncing a right theory; and, that where instructions are in irreconcilable conflict, or so conflicting as to construe or mislead the jury, the rule
requiring instructions to be read together has no
application."
In State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297,67 P2 647, it was held:
''The giving of inconsistent and contradictory
instructions on a material point is error and sufficient ground for reversal."
Thus it is seen that the instructions are erroneous,
not only because instruction number 12 places upon the
defendants Malcolm N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox a duty
which they did not have, but also because instructions
9(a) and 12 are inconsistent. Instruction 9(a) correctly
stated the laws of the case while instruction 12 permitted
the jury to find against the defendants Malcolm N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox on the basis of their failure to do
that which instruction 9·( a) said they were not obligated
to do.
In the court's instruction number 17, the court repeated the error it had made in submitting the issue of
loss of earning power to the jury by instructing the jury
that in determining the amount of damages which the
plaintiff had suffered, they should also take into consideration the loss of earning capacity, if any, which Steven
L. West has sustained. On this point, the court further
instructed :
"In this connection, you should award to the
plaintiff such sum of money as you find from a
preponderance of the evidence he has lost from
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being unable to ('arry on his usual work since the
date of the accident to the present time, and you
should also consider whether or not a preponderance of the evidence shows that his capacity to
earn money in the future has been diminished. You
are further instructed that the court will apply
the mathematical formula to arrive at the present
worth of future earnings if the jury will fix the
mnount of loss in earning capacity and determine
the number of years during which the plaintiff
would sustain such a loss."
Not only was this instruction erroneous for the reasons pointed out above, but the last part of the instruction seems to imply that the jury should return some kind
of finding in this regard so that the court could apply
a mathematical formula. The foregoing practically required the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, further accentuating the plaintiff's theory of recovery.
In connection therewith, the court failed to give the
jury the usual instruction, defendants' request number 15,
that the fact that he had instructed them on damages was
not to be taken by the jury as an indication of whether
he believed or did not believe that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The court intended to give this request
and indicated that he had done so (R 113); however, a
perusal of the instruction given will show that such was
not done. The court also apparently intended to give the
defendant Cox's requested instruction number 6, (R 104)
submitting the issue of unavoidable accident, and requested instruction number 7 (R 105) submitting the issue of
whether the accident was solely caused by the negligence
of Hal Anderson, which were necessary to present the
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defense theory of these defendants, but did not do so;
nor were these requested instructions covered by those
which were given (R 116-128).
The manner in which this accident happened was so
unusual and required a combination of circumstances so
unlikely to occur that the jury might reasonably have
found that no one was negligent or legally responsible
for the accident and an instruction to the effect that if
the jury should so find, they should not return a verdict
for the plaintiff against the defendants Cox and McKinnon would have been proper.
By their requested instruction number 10, the defendants ~1alcolm N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox requested
the court to instruct the jury as follows:
"You are instructed that the defendants Cox,
McKinnon, doing business as American Fuel Company and Eastern Utah Development Company,
had a right to assume that when said truck was
parked for loading its brakes were in good condition and that they had been securely set, and if
necessary, that the truck had been placed in a
gear which would restrict its forward movement
so as to hold said truck in place during the loading operation performed by the usual and ordinary method and performed with the same care
as would be exercised by an ordinarily prudent
person under like circumstances. Therefore, if
you find from the evidence that said loading operation was performed with ordinary care as in
this instruction defined, said defendants would
not be responsible for plaintiff's injuries no matter what caused the truck to roll forward from
the place where it had been parked for loading,
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and your verdict should be for said defendants,
and each of them, no cause of action."
As stated under Points I and II of this brief, this
instruction included all of the issues of fact on defendants' theory of defense, and the correct rule of law applicable thereto. By refusing to give it, the court failed
to instruct the jury on defendants' theory of the case.
CONCLUSION
The evidence is undisputed that this accident did
not happen because of the manner in which Cox loaded
the truck. The moving pictures established conclusively
that if the brakes of the truck had been parked in the
low range gear ratio with the brakes set, it would not
have moved during the loading operation, and the jury
in its answers to the interrogatories so found. If Clyde
Cox was entitled to assume that the truck was properly
parked and the brakes set, as the jury was instructed
in 9 (a), he did not have a duty to check the truck before
commencing to load it, nor was he under a duty to defer
loading it, unless Anderson stayed in the cab. The "foresight" rule and not the "hindsight" rule is applicable in
this situation, as in other cases involving negligence.
These truckers owned their trucks and were in a hurry
to get loaded and on their way, as they were paid according to the tonnage hauled. Was it reasonable to require
Cox to be familiar with the brake mechanism of all the
various trucks coming upon the premises, or to delay
loading operations pending an examination to see that
each truck was properly braked~ These men would re-
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sent undue interference any such conduct on the part of
Cox on how they should operate their trucks. Could not
Cox assume, until reasonably apprized to the contrary,
that Anderson would take whatever precautions were
necessary to insure the safety of the truck he was driving?
The injuries in this case were severe. Because of
the sympathy which a jury would naturally have for the
plaintiff as against the American Fuel Company, a corporation, it was essential that the instructions set out
the theory of both sides fairly and adequately, which
was not done. Because of the undue emphasis in the
instruction on the plaintiff's theory of recovery, it would
be an unusual jury that would not return a verdict
against the defendants.
We respectfully submit that the verdict in this case
should be set aside and a judgment of No Cause of Action
entered in favor of the defendants Malcolm N. McKinnon
and Clyde Cox, or in the alternative that they be granted
a new trial.
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON

Attorneys for Defend.Aarnts ami/, Appellants Ualcolm N. McKifllfl<on ood Olyde
Cox

520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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